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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  paper  provides  a joint  theoretical–empirical  investigation  to
assess  the adoption  by  manufacturing  ﬁrms  of  innovations  aimed
at  improving  waste  related  performance.  In line  with  the recent
emphasis  on the  ‘external’  factors  stimulating  innovation,  which
often  are  more  important  than  ‘traditional’  drivers  such  as  R&D,
we  address  the  role  of  local  policy  environments  and  regional  fea-
tures.  We  analyse  ﬁrms’  innovation  adoption  choices  in  a simpliﬁed
technology  adoption  model,  augmented  to  account  for  factors  rel-
evant  to determining  environmental  innovation  (EI).  We  frame  our
empirical  analysis  in an  original  integration  of  data  from  a ﬁrm  level
survey  (Italian  CIS2008  survey  of  manufacturing  ﬁrms)  and  regional
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level  waste  related  information.  Our  econometric  analysis  shows
that ﬁrms  adopt  EI  on  the  basis  of  some  ﬁrm  speciﬁc  and  relational
factors,  while  usual  drivers  such  as  R&D  have  no  impact.  The  evi-
dence from  our  study  supports  the  role of  regional  factors  related  to
waste  management  and  policy,  that  is, ﬁrms  located  in  regions  fea-
turing better  separated  waste  collection  and  stricter  waste  policy
are more  likely  to  adopt  EI.
© 2014  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.
1. Introduction
Various streams of the ‘economics of waste’ literature explore the range of factors correlated with
waste performance, including waste generation, waste recycling/waste management and waste dis-
posal, at the macro and micro levels (D’Amato et al., 2013; Johnstone and Labonne, 2004; Mazzanti
and Montini, 2009; Shinkuma and Managi, 2011). Therefore, it is surprising that the role and determi-
nants of innovation in waste and materials/resources consumption have only recently begun to attract
research attention. The diffusion of environmental innovation (EI) is crucial (Kemp and Pontoglio,
2011) to achieve sustainability and competitiveness, especially in highly industrialized countries. The
literature suggests that several social, economic and policy factors contribute to explaining waste per-
formance and, possibly, driving related innovation (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009; Mazzanti et al., 2008).
Within this literature, there are several studies of waste generation and disposal and their drivers,
that analyse regional frameworks (Allers and Hoeben, 2010; De Jaeger and Eyckmans, 2008; Dijkgraaf
and Gradus, 2009, 2004; Hage and Soderholm, 2008).
Among the very few papers that focus speciﬁcally on EI in the waste realm, Horbach et al. (2012)
investigate the determinants of EI in several environmentally relevant ﬁelds, and use 2009 CIS (Com-
munity Innovation Survey) data for Germany with a speciﬁc focus on the role played by (current and
expected) regulation, cost savings and consumer beneﬁts. Managi et al. (2014) analyse the technol-
ogy adopted by municipalities in Japan and suggest that central government’s policies may  generate
inappropriate incentives. We  contribute to this literature by developing a joint theoretical–empirical
investigation of the decisions about innovation adoption made by manufacturing ﬁrms in the waste
and resources realm. We  focus on the case of Italy, due to the signiﬁcant degree of heterogeneity
in terms of environmental and economic performance across different areas (Mazzanti et al., 2012),
which has created problems related to the management of local ‘hot spots’. Italy provides a vivid
example of the need to boost innovation, starting at ﬁrm level, in order to reduce the consumption of
material resources and related production of waste.
In line with works that highlight the external inﬂuences affecting innovation, we investigate the
role of local policy environments and regional structural features. R&D investment seems to have lost
its primacy among the drivers of innovation at ﬁrm level. This ‘new framework’ is especially applicable
to radical and socially interlinked innovations such as environmental inventions and their adoption.
Research is shifting the focus of analysis in non-R&D centric directions (Cainelli et al., 2012).
We develop a series of theory-based, testable implications regarding the extent to which ﬁrm
behaviour is inﬂuenced by external factors, such as waste policies and infrastructures (landﬁll taxes,
indicators of local commitment and performance related to waste, waste policy stringency, etc.). We
frame our empirical analysis in an original integration of ﬁrm survey data (CIS – 2006–2008 data)1
and regional level waste related information derived from the Italian Environmental Agency’s waste
reports. We  use CIS2008 data because this was the ﬁrst survey that asked about EI adoption. The
dataset we exploit contains more than 6000 Italian manufacturing ﬁrms observed over 2006–2008.
The merging of CIS data with regionally related data on waste performance is, to our knowledge, a
1 The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is the main and ofﬁcial EU survey on innovation adoption by ﬁrms. Microdata are
available only at the national (not regional) level, which is one of our justiﬁcations for choosing Italian CIS data.
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novel direction in the EI literature, and allows us to analyse how innovation adoption is inﬂuenced by
ﬁrm-based, sector-based and geographic policy-based factors.
Our paper is mostly linked to two literature streams. First, we refer to the literature on technology
adoption and environmental policy that originated with Milliman and Prince’s (1989) and Downing
and White’s (1986) contributions.2 The very simple theoretical model developed in Section 2 of this
paper relies on the standard assumptions in that literature and derives, in particular, plausible con-
clusions about how waste policy (in our setting, a landﬁll tax and/or a waste tariff) might affect the
incentives for technology adoption. Secondly, and most importantly, the present study is linked to the
literature on the drivers and determinants of EI: speciﬁcally, EI adoption. Deﬁnitions of eco-innovation
(Kemp, 2000, 2010) highlight the ecological attributes of speciﬁc new processes, products and meth-
ods from a technical and ecological perspective. For example, the MEI  (Measuring Eco-Innovation)
research project deﬁnes eco-innovation as the production, assimilation and exploitation of a prod-
uct, production process, service or management or business method, that is novel to the organization
(developing or adopting it), whose life-cycle results in a reduction of environmental risks, pollution
and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives. The inclusion of new
organizational methods, products, services and knowledge-oriented innovations in this deﬁnition,
differentiates it from the deﬁnition of environmental technologies as all technologies whose use is
less environmentally harmful than relevant alternatives (Kemp, 2010). We  aim to capture the drivers
of EI that are outside the ﬁrm’s boundary and reside in the institutional and economic features of the
territory. Theoretically, this implies the need to enrich the predictions of (policy oriented) theoretical
analysis with the considerations included in a ‘regional systems of innovation’ approach (Beaudry and
Breschi, 2003; Boschma and Lambooy, 2002; Iammarino, 2005; Iammarino and McCann, 2006), in
order to investigate the key elements of regions (Cainelli, 2008; Cainelli et al., 2007) that foster waste
related innovations. Several papers investigate EI drivers. These include Horbach et al. (2012) which,
as already referred to, focus on the determinants of EI in several environmental realms in Germany,
and Kneller and Manderson (2012) which examine the link between innovation and environmental
regulations in UK. However, our contribution is, to our knowledge, one of very few studies to focus
on how ﬁrm level innovation incentives are affected by local idiosyncratic features of waste related
infrastructures, and by the shape of policy interventions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background that informs the
empirical analysis; Section 3 describes the data and models; Section 4 discusses the main econometric
evidence; and Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
This section sets out our research hypotheses with respect to the main determinants of innova-
tion, in the form of adoption, related to waste. We  focus on the impact of waste related policies and
the existing waste infrastructures, and their inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ adoption of less resource-intensive
technologies. We  discuss the role of other relevant factors, including ﬁrm speciﬁc features.
2.1. Role of policy, infrastructures and ﬁrm speciﬁc features
We  model a representative economic agent (we  focus on a ﬁrm, but without loss of generality)
generating waste and subject to regulation. We  denote the waste production level as g. Our theoretical
framework is purposely stylized, so that g is intended broadly to measure the environmental impact
of waste related choices taken by the agent: thus, it might quantify waste generation as well as the
environmental impact of the ﬁrm’s waste management practices more generally.
The regulated ﬁrm features an existing technology, denoted by the waste reduction cost function
c(g,); parameter  measures ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics that the literature suggests are signiﬁcant
drivers of eco innovation (Horbach et al., 2012). Relevant ﬁrm speciﬁc factors include technological
2 For a very good survey, see Requate (2005).
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capability improvements led by R&D, organizational innovations such as the adoption of Environ-
mental Management Systems (EMS, Rennings et al., 2006), and the quality of the available knowledge
transfer mechanisms according to the sources of knowledge and the ﬁrm’s effectiveness at using the
information.
The waste reduction cost function c(·) satisﬁes, for any given value of , standard assumptions:
cg(·) < 0 – costs decrease with waste production (or, more broadly, with poorer waste management by
the ﬁrm) – and cgg(·) > 0.3
We  expect better ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics to imply, ceteris paribus, lower costs, so that we
assume that c(·) < 0. Also cg(·) > 0, that is, a larger  implies a smaller (absolute value of the) marginal
cost related to g: in other words, the larger is , the weaker are the incentives for the regulated ﬁrm
to reduce costs by increasing g.
We  address the role played by waste policy and waste related infrastructures in a simpliﬁed way.
More speciﬁcally, these factors are subsumed in a unit payment for waste (e.g. a waste related tax),
t = t(ˇ, ı), where  ˇ is a measure of the waste policy stringency (a larger  ˇ implying stricter regulation),
and ı is a measure of the state of waste related infrastructures, with a larger ı implying worse waste
related infrastructures. Parameter  ˇ can be intended as a measure of the authorities’ commitment
to lower waste production and/or the impact of ﬁrms’ waste management practices, for example, in
the form of higher unit waste taxes or tariffs. A larger value of ı, on the other hand, can be linked to
existing separated collection or landﬁll rates. We  assume that tˇ > 0, that is, waste production (or,
more generally, a larger environmental impact related to waste management) is perceived as more
costly under stricter regulation. On the other hand, tı can be positive or negative: if it is positive,
then a relatively poor state of existing waste related infrastructures implies a larger unit payment for
regulated ﬁrms, for example, due to the need for the waste management authorities to cover relatively
large landﬁll costs. If tı is negative, then a better state of waste related infrastructures results in a larger
unit payment for waste related impacts; this can occur, for example, if better separated collection
facilities imply that the relative “price” of separated collection over undifferentiated waste production
decreases (i.e. the relative “price” of high impact waste practices increases). In this second case, a better
state of waste related infrastructures acts in the same direction as a stricter waste policy.
Finally, we  model technology adoption, assuming that the ﬁrm can choose to install a new technol-
ogy featuring lower waste reduction costs for any given level of waste production and of the value of
parameter . More speciﬁcally, by paying a ﬁxed cost F, the regulated ﬁrm can reduce the costs c(·) by
the factor 0 <  ˛ < 1, the smaller the factor the larger the cost savings due to the new technology. Thus,
if the new technology is adopted, the cost of waste reduction (and, therefore, the cost advantage of
increasing waste production) decreases.
The agent’s cost minimization problem under the existing technology can be written as:
mingCo = c(g, ) + t(ˇ, ı)g (1)
where the subscript o labels the “old” (i.e. existing) technology. Given the assumption of a convex cost
function,4 the ﬁrst order (necessary and sufﬁcient) conditions with respect to g imply:
cg(·) + t(·) = 0, (2)
resulting in a waste level go; the corresponding signs of the comparative statics are as reported in the
second column in Table 1.5 As expected, a stricter waste policy and better ﬁrm speciﬁc features imply
lower levels of waste production. The impact of waste related infrastructures, however, is ambiguous.
The corresponding ﬁrm’s problem when the new technology is adopted is:
mingCn = F + ˛c(g, ) + t(ˇ, ı)g (3)
3 Coherently with the existing literature (e.g. Requate, 2005), the cost function c(g,) can be interpreted as measuring the
costs  of reducing waste to some level g below the laissez-faire (unregulated) level.
4 We limit our attention to interior solutions.
5 Details concerning comparative statics are provided in Appendix A, Table A1.
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Table 1
Comparative statics.
Parameter Existing technology (go) New technology (gn)
Policy strictness (ˇ) − −
Infrastructures (ı) +/− +/−
Firm speciﬁc features () − −
New technology cost savings (˛) 0 +
where subscript n denotes the ‘new technology’. First order (necessary and sufﬁcient) conditions are:
˛cg(·) + t(·) = 0, (4)
implying a waste level gn and the comparative statics reported in the third column of Table 1. Compar-
ing (2) and (4), and accounting for the convexity of c(·) with respect to g, we  can easily conclude that,
for given parameters values, go > gn. Finally, we  should note that a larger cost reduction potential of
the new technology (a smaller parameter ˛) implies a smaller amount of waste produced using the
same technology, which is a reasonable conclusion.
In order to assess the incentives for the ﬁrm under scrutiny to adopt the cleaner technology, we
deﬁne the net cost gain from adoption as follows:
 = c(go, ) − ˛c(gn, ) − F + t(ˇ, ı)(go − gn) (5)
that is, the difference arising between the equilibrium costs with the existing technology and those
with the new technology. Clearly, a negative value of  implies that adoption does not take place,
while incentives for adoption are stronger the larger the value of .  We  can now turn to the main
results of our theoretical analysis.6
Result 1. A stricter waste policy implies larger adoption incentives, namely the effect induced by the
policy is improved technology adoption.
Result 1 is indeed reasonable: a stricter waste policy implies a larger unit payment t(·), making the
adoption of the new technology (and the resulting decrease in equilibrium waste production) more
attractive.
Result 2. A better state of the ‘waste management related infrastructures’, for example, in the form of
better separated collection systems, has an ambiguous impact on adoption incentives.
The state of waste related infrastructures can lead to larger or smaller adoption incentives: in
particular, when t(·) increases as existing infrastructures improve (i.e. as ı decreases), then better
waste related facilities – for example, proxied by larger (smaller) separated collection (landﬁll) rates
– act exactly as a stricter waste policy, and imply stronger incentives for technology adoption.
Result 3. Improved ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics can imply larger incentives for technology adoption. This
is the case when ﬁrm speciﬁc factors are sufﬁciently effective in lowering the marginal costs of waste
reduction.
The impact of ﬁrm speciﬁc features on adoption incentives can be explained as follows: ﬁrst, due to
cg > 0 and to go > gn, then |c(go, )| < |c(gn, )|; in other words, better ﬁrm related characteristics
have a smaller impact (in absolute terms) on the c(·) function when the equilibrium waste production
g is set at the level arising under the old (i.e. existing) technology. This effect encourages adoption.
On the other hand, the fact that  ˛ < 1 implies that the impact of ﬁrm related characteristics is, ceteris
paribus, weaker when the new technology is adopted (i.e. costs of waste reduction are affected less by
a given increase in  for any level of g when the new technology is adopted). Therefore, the net effect
depends (also) on how the marginal cost reduction related to increases in g reacts to an improvement
in ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics.
6 The proofs are reported in Appendix A.
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One additional remark is needed. In our paper, we do not explicitly address other potential drivers
of innovation, the most important of which are market pull factors. As Horbach et al. (2012) underline
in surveying previous studies, evidence does not seem to provide strong support to the relevance of
demand side factors; among others, Rehfeld et al. (2007) suggest that environmental product inno-
vations are made tougher by the expensiveness of eco-friendly products, while Kammerer (2009)
identiﬁes the crucial role of consumer beneﬁts in driving eco-innovation. The empirical analysis in
Horbach et al. (2012) shows that the demand side is important in explaining eco-innovation (also) in
the areas of recycling and use of materials. We  lack comprehensive information on potential market
pull factors, and leave the assessment of their impact on adoption incentives to future research.
2.2. Research hypotheses
The theoretical model suggests testable implications that can be summed up in two research
hypotheses related to our empirical analysis.
H1. Idiosyncratic regional waste factors related to waste management and waste policy are positively
correlated to EI.
This hypothesis is oriented to capturing ‘regulatory’, institutional and infrastructural aspects of
waste systems that may  inﬂuence adoption and EI more generally (Johnstone et al., 2012), in a regional
context. The assumption of a positive correlation between waste policy stringency and commitment to
improved public management of waste on the one side, and adoption incentives on the other, is based
on Result 1. However, as Result 2 shows, the hypothesis of a positive link between infrastructures
and EI adoption cannot be taken for granted. We  also expect regional idiosyncratic factors to be more
signiﬁcant than the usual geographical factors captured by geo-dummies, for explaining EI adoption.
We use two regional waste management and waste policy related proxies to test diverse elements of
the ‘decentralized environment’: (i) regional performance in separated collection of municipal waste;
(ii) diffusion of the new waste tariff. The new waste management tariff was  introduced by Italian
Legislative Decree No. 22/1997 and, in theory, was  expected to be an improvement on the former
waste management tax by making total tariff payments increase with actual waste production.7 How-
ever, because Legislative Decree 22/1997 provides for a transition phase that has proven gradual and
very slow, a mechanism close to the earlier tax continues to be levied in many Italian municipali-
ties. Effective implementation of the tariff system is highly dependent on local policy decisions and
practices. Policy implementation is heterogeneous even across areas with similar incomes and similar
socio-economic variables. The shift away from the old ‘non environmentally oriented’ tax is, however,
expected to capture commitment towards better waste management inherent in the new tariff.
Regional separated collection performance and implementation of a waste tariff are used as proxies
for regional waste management and policy strategies, measured by actual performance (partly regu-
latory driven) and policy commitment (e.g. taxes and tariffs). These proxies are complemented by a
third measure of waste policy stringency, namely a regional landﬁll tax – introduced in 1996 in Italy
and subject to regional competence in the deﬁnition of tax levels. Including the landﬁll tax provides
an additional hint about the role of waste related infrastructures. More speciﬁcally, we cannot exclude
the case where the landﬁll tax drives the results in an opposite direction with respect to the two other
measures of policy commitment outlined above.
H2.  The quality of information diffusion in local networks and ﬁrm speciﬁc features, such as belonging
to a business group, R&D and so on, are expected to increase EI performance.
This set of drivers is linked to Result 3. Result 3 clariﬁes that we  cannot expect all linkages to be
supported by our empirical investigation. However, the intuition related to Result 3 suggests that
the existence of a signiﬁcant and positive impact of a subset of the considered ﬁrm speciﬁc factors
according to our estimates, would (indirectly) support the view that those factors are also effective
7 The former tax was calculated on the area of household living space; the new tariff is based on full-cost pricing principles
for  waste management services, and includes some market based features.
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in reducing the marginal cost savings generated by a larger waste production (or a poorer waste
management).
3. The data
We  address our research questions using two  different statistical sources. The ﬁrst is the 2006–2008
wave of the Italian CIS. This survey provides information on EI for a representative sample of 6483
manufacturing ﬁrms. It also collects data on EI adoption along different dimensions. In this paper, we
exploit information concerning ﬁrm level adoption of EI related to waste and material ﬂows.
The question we focus on in the CIS survey asks: “During the three years 2006 to 2008, did your
enterprise introduce a product (good or service), process, organisational or marketing innovation with
any of the following environmental beneﬁts?”. More precisely, we use, as our dependent variable, the
speciﬁc answer concerning ‘Environmental beneﬁts from the production of goods or services within
your enterprise’ in relation to <Recycled waste, water or materials>”. We  label the resulting variable
as ECOWA.8
It has been established that EI adoption is generally considered a better proxy for measuring the
ﬁrm’s innovation capacity and intensity than environmental patents.
The second source is the dataset provided by ISPRA (the Italian Environmental Agency), which
covers regional waste management and waste disposal, and provides information on regional waste
policy.9 These data allow us to link regional information on waste to ﬁrms. Although CIS data do not
provide exact information on the speciﬁc location of ﬁrms, we  know the region in which the ﬁrm is
located, which, given the idiosyncratic features of the Italian local systems of production, is very useful
(Antonioli et al., 2013; Cainelli et al., 2012). The different ‘capitalistic models’ of the different areas of
Italy – some characterized by big ﬁrms (Lombardy, Piedmont), others by dense networks of small and
medium size ﬁrms agglomerated in districts (Veneto, Emilia Romagna) – and the decentralized nature
of the waste management/policy process, require an understanding of whether, and how signiﬁcantly,
EI adoption derives from these local/regional factors. Turning to the ‘management/policy’ variables
associated with waste, as already outlined in Section 2.2, we focus on (i) collection of separated waste,
(ii) waste tariffs, and (iii) landﬁll taxation, which capture different factors of the regional regulatory
framework for waste management/disposal.
We  merge CIS ﬁrm and waste data so that each ﬁrm is associated with well-deﬁned heterogeneous
regional – ‘meso’ – characteristics (Cole et al., 2009). To our knowledge, this dataset is a novelty in
the environmental innovation literature. It allows us to investigate new areas of regionally-related
waste performance, and to analyse the way that EI adoption is inﬂuenced by ﬁrm and geographical
policy-based factors.
Table 2a provides a description of our main variables, and reports some descriptive statistics (mean
and standard deviation). These variables, which refer to internal and regional ‘policy’ factors, are
assumed to inﬂuence EI adoption. As the brief descriptions in Table 2a suggest, four categories of
variables will be used in our econometric estimates. Our main dependent variable is the (already
outlined) dummy  variable related to the presence (or absence) of waste related EI (ECOWA). We
also account for another dependent variable, related to the adoption by ﬁrms of process and product
innovation in general (INNOVA), which is often correlated with EI adoption. We  then have two sets of
variables related to ﬁrms’ features, namely, a ﬁrst set of relational factors, mostly linked to information
ﬂows, and a second set of ﬁrms’ characteristics, measuring productivity, R&D and other structural
features. The last set of variables, already described in Section 2.2, is related to regional waste policy
and performance. The econometric analysis also accounts for other more standard variables related to
the size (in terms of number of employees, see Table 2b) and the geographical location of ﬁrms under
scrutiny.
8 This variable is the closest we  are aware of to our empirical research focus.
9 As an exception, for the landﬁll tax at regional level we have used data collected and exploited in Nicolli and Mazzanti
(2013); these data have been collected through the use of ofﬁcial regional web sites and through telephone interviews with
regional ofﬁces. We  thank the authors for making landﬁll tax data available.
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Table 2a
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Description
Ecowaa 0.252 0.434 Adoption of waste related innovation
Innovaa 0.498 0.500 Adoption of a technological general innovation (process and product)
Relational factors
Sentg 0.432 0.495 Information on innovation received from internal sources
Ssup  0.365 0.481 Information on innovation received from suppliers
Sins 0.209 0.406 Information on innovation received from private research institutes and
consultancy ﬁrms
Scon 0.214 0.410 Information on innovation received at conferences
Spro  0.125 0.331 Information on innovation received from ﬁrm’s business associations
Firms internal factors
Rtr 0.259 0.438 Presence of formal training for employees
Group 0.297 0.457 Membership to a business group
Lprod06 11.881 0.816 Labour productivity in 2006 (natural logarithm of labour productivity, given
by  total turnover/employees)
R&D 0.305 0.460 Presence of R&D
Regional variables
Sep-collec 15.74 11.27 Share of regional separated collection (%) – average 2000–2005
Tarif 9.05 12.94 Share of population covered by the ‘new’ tariff system (%) – average 2000–2005
Land  14.53 5.51 Landﬁll tax level in the region (D per ton) – average 2000–2005
N. Obs.: 6483.
a Dependent variables.
Table 2b
Sample structure by ﬁrm size.
Firms Employeesa
N. % N. %
1–49 4168 64.3 85,466 9.3
50–249 1533 23.6 156,253 17.1
250+  782 12.1 673,577 73.6
Total  6483 100.0 915,296 100.0
a Number of employees (average 2006–2008).
4. Empirical results
In our econometric speciﬁcation, we estimate the following probit model (Horbach, 2008; Cainelli
et al., 2012; Veugelers, 2012):
Pr(Yi = 1|X) = ˚(X, ) (6)
where  ˚ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and Yi is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a ﬁrm i introduces an EI and 0 otherwise. X is the set of covariates
described in Tables 2a and 2b. Our dependent variable is ECOWA – a dummy  variable – which is equal
to 1 if the ﬁrm adopts waste related innovation and 0 otherwise.
Table 3 reports our (baseline) econometric estimates using a bivariate probit model, which accounts
for the correlation between ECOWA and the propensity to introduce technological innovations
(INNOVA) at ﬁrm level. This relatedness, which occurs via correlation of the errors, can be tested by
computing a simple Wald test. Analysis of this test shows that the hypothesis of no correlation between
these two innovation adoption variables cannot be rejected.10 It is well known that this hypothesis
10 We  also calculated the correlation between ECOWA and INNOVA (0.215); as a result a slight (though non-negligible)
correlation across the two dependent variables arises in our biprobit speciﬁcation.
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Table 3
Factors correlated to ECOWA and INNOVA.
Estimation method Biprobit
Dep. var. ECOWA INNOVA
[1.] [2.]
Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values
Sentg 0.117** 2.21 1.570*** 22.48
Ssup  0.126*** 2.67 1.235*** 16.0
Sins  0.201*** 4.12 0.517*** 4.42
Scon  0.143*** 2.99 0.686*** 5.99
Spro  0.109* 1.94 0.385** 2.33
Rtr  0.183*** 3.91 1.22*** 10.29
Group  0.123*** 2.64 −0.220*** −2.99
Lprod06 0.066** 2.53 0.84** 2.25
R&D  0.014 0.29 0.701*** 7.09
D1-49  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
D50-249 0.096** 2.03 −0.007 −0.09
D250+ 0.408*** 6.03 0.008 0.06
North-West 0.014 0.13 0.329* 1.79
North-East 0.170 1.52 0.286 1.55
Centre 0.124 1.05 0.079 0.40
South  0.169 1.40 0.114 0.58
Islands Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.  Obs. 6483 6483
Wald  test (p value) 0.182
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
is crucial for understanding whether the phenomenon of eco-innovation adoption is correlated with
the general propensity to innovate. In this case, adoption of ECOWA seems to be a phenomenon that
can be treated in isolation from INNOVA. This allows us to estimate our (baseline) speciﬁcation adopt-
ing a simple probit model. Table 4 presents the coefﬁcients (column [1.]) and the related marginal
effects (column [2.]) of the same (baseline) econometric speciﬁcation as in Table 3, estimated using
this model. The main conclusions based on Table 4 can be summarized as follows. The information
from various ‘sources’ is positively correlated to ECOWA. This conﬁrms the ‘relational’ needs and
content of EI. In order to innovate, ﬁrms exploit their networks. Somewhat surprisingly, R&D is not
statistically signiﬁcant for determining waste speciﬁc EI. This is a peculiar feature of the waste related
EI adoption under scrutiny, while R&D turns out to be relevant for explaining innovation in broader
terms (see Table 3, column “INNOVA”). Among the ﬁrm speciﬁc variables, the dummies for whether
workers receive a training programme and whether the ﬁrm belongs to a business group are positively
correlated with EI and statistically signiﬁcant. The latter result is not unexpected since the business
group is the organizational form adopted by Italian ﬁrms that want to grow (Cainelli and Iacobucci,
2007). Also, the lagged labour productivity variable seems to have a positive and statistically signif-
icant effect on adoption of ECOWA. The evidence on ﬁrm speciﬁc features implies that support for
our testable implication H2 is mixed: improvements in some of the ﬁrms’ characteristics (such as the
ability to exploit information sources and labour productivity) imply a larger willingness to adopt EI,
indirectly also suggesting that such characteristics can indeed be relevant for reducing the incentive
for ﬁrms to increase their environmental impact to achieve short-run cost savings. On the other hand,
ﬁrm speciﬁc features which, in principle, would be expected to inﬂuence EI more broadly (namely
general R&D), do not seem to matter for waste and resources related adoption.
Next, we move to analyse the impact of geographic related waste management/policy factors. Given
that, as Table 4 suggests, geographical dummies are not statistically signiﬁcant, we  need to explore
other regional factors.
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Table 4
Factors correlated to ECOWA.
Estimation method Probit
Dep. var. ECOWA
[1.] [2.]
Coeff. t-values dF/dx t-values
Sentg 0.116** 2.19 0.036** 2.19
Ssup  0.125*** 2.64 0.039*** 2.64
Sins  0.201*** 4.12 0.064*** 4.12
Scon  0.143*** 2.99 0.045*** 2.99
Spro  0.109* 1.93 0.034* 1.93
Rtr  0.184*** 3.92 0.058*** 3.92
Group  0.123*** 2.63 0.038*** 2.63
Lprod06 0.066** 2.52 0.020** 2.52
R&D  0.014 0.28 0.004 0.28
D1-49  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
D50-249 0.096** 2.04 0.030** 2.04
D250+ 0.409*** 6.03 0.138*** 6.03
North-West 0.014 0.13 0.004 0.13
North-East 0.170 1.53 0.053 1.53
Centre 0.124 1.05 0.039 1.05
South  0.170 1.40 0.054 1.40
Islands Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.  Obs. 6483 6483
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.088
AIC  6757.7 6757.7
BIC  7015.3 7015.3
Correctly classiﬁed 75.5% 75.5%
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Introducing the share of separated waste collection (Table 5, column [1]), which is a target of EU
and Italian law, does not change previous results. Its statistical signiﬁcance is high, which means that
ﬁrms located in regions with higher levels of separated collection (higher policy commitment), are
more likely to adopt ECOWA. This can be interpreted as evidence that better infrastructures (producing
better performance) boost waste related EI adoption. In light of Result 2 and, consequently, testable
hypothesis H1, this implies that better separated collection is perceived as reducing the opportunity
costs of clean waste practices by regulated ﬁrms; as a result, incentives for adoption are stronger. As in
Tables 3 and 4, geographical factors do not seem to matter, and the evidence concerning ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors is conﬁrmed. Therefore, we can conclude that larger and more productive ﬁrms promote EI,
and regional waste management provides further incentives.
Columns [2] and [3] in Table 5 explore the implications of Results 1 and 2 using other proxies.
We test the role of landﬁll taxes (column [2]) and waste tariffs (column [3]) (Mazzanti et al., 2012).
Our estimates show that tariffs are positively correlated to ECOWA adoption, while landﬁll taxes
seem, at least in this speciﬁcation, to be not signiﬁcant.11 Indeed, landﬁll taxes address waste disposal
rather than waste generation and waste management. In other words, they act at a level which is
too “far” from waste production to provide any virtuous incentive along the waste ﬁliere (Mazzanti
and Zoboli, 2006) and, therefore, to encourage improvements in waste related adoption. Waste tariffs,
11 Appendix B reports a fourth speciﬁcation which addresses the three policy variables simultaneously, and acts as an addi-
tional check on our results (Tables B1–B3). We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension. Notice that in this
speciﬁcation, the landﬁll tax is signiﬁcant with a negative sign. This conﬁrms that a higher landﬁll tax might be interpreted as
a  hint of a bad state of waste related infrastructures, with a related negative impact on adoption incentives.
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Table 5
Factors correlated to ECOWA.
Estimation method Probit
Dep. var. ECOWA
[1] [2] [3]
Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values
Sep-collec 0.109** 2.16 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Land  . . . . . . −0.175 −1.48 . . . . . .
Tarif  . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.011*** 2.93
Sentg  0.116** 2.54 0.114*** 2.59 0.112*** 2.56
Ssup  0.126*** 3.10 0.125*** 3.04 0.128*** 3.18
Sins  0.201*** 3.94 0.200*** 3.96 0.201*** 3.95
Scon  0.142*** 3.34 0.142*** 3.30 0.139*** 3.15
Spro  0.111*** 4.29 0.109*** 4.03 0.109*** 4.00
Rtr  0.184*** 4.01 0.183*** 3.97 0.186*** 4.12
Group  0.125*** 2.98 0.116*** 2.82 0.120*** 2.90
Lprod06 0.064** 2.58 0.067*** 2.65 0.062** 2.41
R&D  0.014 0.37 0.019 0.53 0.020 0.59
D1-49  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
D50-249 0.097*** 3.00 0.101*** 2.96 0.109*** 2.97
D250+ 0.411*** 10.05 0.418*** 11.01 0.433*** 10.26
North-West −0.216 −0.98 −0.013 −0.08 −0.076 −0.41
North-East −0.050 −0.22 0.222 1.13 −0.184 −0.86
Centre −0.019 −0.09 0.134 0.77 −0.043 −0.23
South  0.117 0.60 0.145 0.77 0.161 0.85
Islands Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.  Obs. 6483 6483 6483
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.083 0.090
AIC  6717.0 6713.1 6703.7
BIC  6845.7 6841.9 6832.5
Correctly classiﬁed 75.6% 75.4% 75.6%
Note: Standard errors are clustered at regional levels (20 clusters).
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
instead, are at the core of the waste management systems in Italy. The more widespread these tariffs,
the more ﬁrmly the waste system is rooted in economic incentives and oriented towards full cost
recovery. Other results arising from our previous analysis are conﬁrmed, in particular with respect to
ﬁrm-related factors. Again, as in previous tables, ﬁrm’s R&D efforts do not appear to be a statistically
signiﬁcant ﬁrm speciﬁc factor.12
5. Conclusions
The paper presented a theoretical–empirical investigation of manufacturing ﬁrms’ innovation
adoption decisions aimed at improving waste performances. Our emphasis on external innovation
factors as possibly being more important than ‘classic’ drivers such as R&D, allowed us to focus on the
role of policy environments and structural regional features.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, ﬁrms located in regions where policy com-
mitment to improve separated waste collection is stronger, are more likely to adopt waste related
innovations. In contrast, we ﬁnd that ‘pure’ geographical effects are not statistically signiﬁcant: EI
12 We  also performed estimates by interacting our regional policy variables (e.g. separated collection interacted with the
landﬁll variable, and so on). The results are not particularly exciting, and interactions are either weakly statistically signiﬁcant
or  even not signiﬁcant. For this reason we do not report these estimates in the text. They are available upon request.
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adoption, therefore, is affected by speciﬁc regional policy attitudes in relation to environmental/waste
issues rather than by broadly deﬁned regional features. The role of policies is conﬁrmed by the evidence
concerning the introduction of a new and decentralized waste tariff, which is statistically signiﬁcant
and affects adoption incentives positively. These econometric results are coherent with the current
North–South divide related to separated waste collection policy commitment in Italy, and are wor-
rying in that they would seem to suggest that environmental management and policy effects might
further reinforce the existing technological divide among ﬁrms located in different areas, and might
increase economic and environmental differences.
Second, in contrast to much existing work on innovation, waste related innovation seems not to
be sensitive to the presence of R&D, while other ﬁrm speciﬁc features, such as the availability and
ability to exploit information sources and labour productivity, have a positive impact on adoption
incentives. In other words, speciﬁc policy commitment and ﬁrm characteristics related to efﬁciency
and to networking attitudes are necessary to explain EI adoption in the waste realm, while more
general indicators of the propensity to innovate, such as the presence of R&D, do not seem to matter.
Further research could focus on even more localized spatial effects occurring at the provincial and
municipal levels. Original survey data would be needed for such an investigation.
Appendix A.
See Table A1 for comparative statics details.
Proof of Result 1. Differentiating (5) with respect to  ˇ we  get:
∂
∂ˇ
= cg(go, )∂go
∂ˇ
− ˛cg(gn, )∂gn
∂ˇ
+  t(·)∂(go − gn)
∂ˇ
+ (go − gn)tˇ(·).
As ﬁrst order conditions (2) and (4) require cg(go, ) = ˛cg(gn, ) = −t(·), then we  are left with ∂/∂  ˇ =
(go − gn)tˇ(·) > 0. 
Proof of Result 2. Waste related infrastructures affect adoption incentives through parameter ı;
following the same reasoning as in the proof of Result 1, we can conclude that ∂/∂ı = (go − gn)tı(·),
that can be either positive (if tı > 0) or negative (if tı < 0). 
Proof of Result 3. Differentiating (5) with respect to  we get:
∂
∂
= cg(go, )∂go
∂
− ˛cg(gn, )∂gn
∂
+  c(go, ) − ˛c(gn, ) + t(·)
∂(go − gn)
∂
.
Accounting for cg(go, ) = ˛cg(gn, ) = −t(·) from (2) and (4) we are left with ∂/∂ = c(go, ) −
˛c(gn, ).
Under the assumption that cg(·) > 0, and accounting for go > gn then |c(go, )| < |c(gn, )| so that
(c(go, )/c(gn, )) < 1. We  can therefore conclude that: ∂/∂ > 0 when (c(go, )/c(gn, )) <  ˛ <
1, while ∂/∂ < 0 when  ˛ < (c(go, )/c(gn, )) < 1. As a consequence, ∂/∂ > 0 requires that
c(go, )/c(gn, ) is sufﬁciently small, i.e. that cg(·) is sufﬁciently large to guarantee that |c(gn, )| is
sufﬁciently larger than |c(go, )|. 
Table A1
Comparative statics.
Existing technology New technology
Policy strictness (ˇ) ∂go
∂ˇ
= − tˇ (·)
cgg (·) < 0
∂gn
∂ˇ
= − tˇ (·)
˛cgg (·) < 0
Waste related infrastructures (ı) ∂go
∂ı
= − tı(·)
cgg (·) ≥0 if tı ≤ 0
∂gn
∂ı
= − tı(·)
˛cgg (·) ≥0 if tı ≤ 0
Firm  speciﬁc features () ∂go
∂
= − cg (·)
cgg (·) < 0
∂gn
∂
= − cg (·)
cgg (·) < 0
Cost  reduction under the new technology (˛) – ∂gn
∂˛
= − cg (·)
˛cgg (·) > 0
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Appendix B.
Table B1
Additional speciﬁcation.
Estimation method Probit
Dep. var. ECOWA
Coeff. t-values
Sep-collec 0.154*** 3.55
Land −0.180** −2.49
Tarif 0.008*** 3.91
Sentg 0.111** 2.55
Ssup 0.127*** 3.15
Sins  0.200*** 3.95
Scon 0.138*** 3.09
Spro 0.112*** 4.14
Rtr  0.186*** 4.09
Group 0.117*** 2.83
Lprod06 0.062** 2.40
R&D 0.023 0.68
D1-49 Ref. Ref.
D50-249 0.112*** 3.00
D250+ 0.440*** 9.85
North-West −0.407** −2.05
North-East −0.351* −1.67
Centre −0.191 −1.03
South 0.063 0.34
Islands Ref. Ref.
Industry dummy  Yes Yes
N.  Obs. 6483
Pseudo R2 0.091
AIC  6697.1
BIC 6825.9
Correctly classiﬁed 75.7%
Note: Standard errors are clustered at regional levels (20 clusters).
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table B2
Marginal effects (additional speciﬁcation).
Estimation method Probit
Dep. var. ECOWA
dF/dx t-values
Separated collection 0.047*** 3.53
Landﬁll tax −0.055** −2.48
Waste tariff 0.002*** 3.90
Note: Standard errors are clustered at regional levels (20 clusters).
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table B3
Correlation matrix.
[1.] [2.] [3.]
[1.] 1.00
[2.] 0.226 1.00
[3.] 0.375 0.432 1.00
[1.] Separated collection.
[2.] Landﬁll tax.
[3.] Waste tariff.
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